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A NEW RATIONALE FOR IMPLYING PRIVATE RIGHTS
OF ACTION AND SECTION 7 OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, two Circuit Courts of Appeals refined a technique used to
imply a private right of action on behalf of plaintiffs who were without
express statutory remedies.' These new rationales, notwithstanding a
later rebuke by the Supreme Court, are of particular importance to the
administration of some areas of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342
(Exchange Act) because much of the litigation under this Act results
from the implication of private rights of action.' For example, some
1. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d
416 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 1-34, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
3. For examples of private rights of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, see
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Estate Counselling
Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.
1962); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1960); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir.
1956); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson,
203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949); Northern
Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Rosenberg v.
Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp.
476 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946).
For examples of private rights of action under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, see J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 23-26
infra; Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Dann v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Central Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp.
429 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Textron v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass. 1954).
See also Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944) (§ 27 of the Exchange Act);
Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. 111. 1959) (§
12(f) of the Exchange Act); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Secu-
rities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 779 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act]);
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courts have allowed private actions under section 7 of the Exchange
Act,4 the credit regulation section, but their reliance on traditional
rationales has caused great difficulties.5 The 1974 cases could elimi-
Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (same); Hawkins v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (§§ 17(a) and 11
(d)(2) of the Securities Act). See generally Comment, Private Rights and Federal
Remedies: Herein of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1150 (1965); Com-
ment, Private Actions and the Proxy Rules: The Basis and the Breadth of the Federal
Remedy, 31 U. Cia. L. REv. 328 (1964); Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42
VA. L. REV. 537 (1956); Comment, Civil Remedies Available to Buyers and Sellers
Under the 1933 and 1934 Federal Securities Laws, 38 WASH. L. Rnv. 627 (1963).
For examples of other securities-type private rights, see Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber &
Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing
private right under Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 17b (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV 1974)); Kauffman v. Dreyfus, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (no private right of action under Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1970)); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966) (no private right of action under
stock exchange rules); Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961) (no
private right of action for customer of adviser under Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1970)); Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., 392 F. Supp. 646, 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (generally no private right of action under New York Stock Exchange
rules); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(recognized private right of action under Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 17b
(1970), as amended, (Supp. IV 1974). See generally Comment, Exchange Liability for
Improper Enforcement of Its Constitution and Rules: The Investor's Right of Action
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 24 EMORY L.J. 865 (1975); Comment, Pri-
vate Actions for the Brokers "Churning" of a Securities Account, 40 Mo. L. REv. 281
(1975).
For examples of other private rights, see Schiaffo v. Helstocki, 350 F. Supp. 1076,
1097 (D.N.J. 1972) (implied right under 39 U.S.C. §§ 3210-13, the congressional frank-
ing privilege). In Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349
F. Supp. 670, 678-79 & n.1 (D. Neb. 1972), the court cites cases implying private rights
of action in § 14 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970); § 10b of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970); the fourth amendment; § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970); § 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425,
30 Stat. 1121; § 301(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970); § 2 of the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); § 605 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970); § 44 of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970); and § 2 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1970). See generally Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of
Private Enforcement under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 274
(1975).
4. Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
5. See, e.g., Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.
1972); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). See
generally Note, Federal Margin Requirements As a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 CoLum.
L. Rev. 1462 (1966); Comment, Civil Liability for Margin Violations-The Effect of
Section 7(f) and Regulation X, 43 FoRD. L. REv. 93 (1974); Note, Regulation X and
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nate much of the confusion under section 7 because they provide the
means to explore fully the statutory and policy implications of a private
right of action. This Note will examine the traditional private right
rationales, the 1974 cases, the operation of the credit provisions, and the
application of the recent developments to section 7.
II. TRADITIONAL RATIONALES
On its surface, the Exchange Act seems to provide a formidable
barrier to the implication of a private right of action. Congress enacted
a broad regulatory scheme following the 1929 market crash.0 The
breadth of this regulation suggests a major argument, based on the
maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
against the implication of additional remedies. Congress clearly could
have provided private rights throughout the Exchange Act. Instead,
only certain sections expressly provide a private right of action.7 Thus,
the omission of such rights elsewhere indicates an intent to limit private
remedies to those select areas where clearly expressed. 8 As compelling
as this argument may be, courts have, with little reluctance, implied
private rights of action by employing three rationales. 9
The first attempts to broaden the investor protection of the Exchange
Act by implying private rights of action were based upon section 29(b)
of the Act.10  As originally enacted, section 29(b) provided that every
contract in violation of the Exchange Act or its rules or regulations was
void "as regards" the rights of the violator or anyone acquiring rights
under the contract with knowledge of the violation.': In 1938, section
29(b) was amended to include a statute of limitations that applied to
"any person ' and reached "any action maintained in reliance upon this
Investor-Lender Margin Violation Disputes, 57 MINN. L. R1v. 208 (1972); Note, In Parl
Delicto As a Defense to Violations of Margin Legislation Under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 9 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 113 (1974).
6. See Securities Act § 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1970); Exchange Act 3H 1-34,
15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh (1970).
7. See Securities Act § 11, 12(1), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. H3 77k, 771(1), 771(2)
(1970); Exchange Act §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r (1970).
8. See Securities Act §§ 11, 12(1), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 771(1), 771(2)
(1970); Exchange Act §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r (1970).
9. See sources cited notes 10-28 infra and accompanying text. See, e.g., Goldman
v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972); Pearlstein v. Scudder &
German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Remar v.
Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
10. Exchange Act § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
11. See Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 29b, 48 Stat. 903.
12. Exchange Act § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).Washington University Open Scholarship
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section."13  The courts interpreted this language as an affirmative sign
that Congress, by its 1938 amendment, intended to provide implied
private rights within the scheme of the Exchange Act.14  This reasoning
resulted in the proliferation of private rights of action.' 5 The section
29(b) approach has been criticized for lacking liability limiters and
precluding policy considerations.' 6
The second rationale used to imply private rights was based upon the
concept that a statutory violation constitutes a tort.'7  At common law,
four requirements had to be met for the violation of a statute to be
tortious. First, the individual must have been harmed by an act pros-
cribed by the statute.' 8 Second, he must have been in the class of
persons that the statute was intended to protect.' Third, his injury
must have been of the kind the statute was intended to prevent.20
Finally, the injury must have been to an interest that the statute was
intended to protect.21 One potential advantage of this approach is that
it contains the liability limiters found in tort law.22 This rationale,
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also Note,
Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285
(1963).
For the legislative history of § 29(b), see H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1934); S. REp. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1934) (conference report; same text as S. Doc. No. 185, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)); S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
15. See cases cited note 3 supra and accompanying text.
16. See Note, Federal Margin Requirements As a Basis For Civil Liability, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1462, 1482 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
18. See Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Dann v. Studebaker-
Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.,
282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Howard v. Furst, 238
F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D.
Mass. 1949); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 286 (1965).
19. REsTATEMENT (SECoND) OF Tom-s § 286 (1965).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Note, supra note 16, at 1471-73 (1966).
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however, necessarily places great reliance on the stated purposes and
legislative history of a statute. Consequently, the strict application of
this approach may be crippled by an equivocal legislative history.
The third method used to imply private rights was the enforcement
rationale expressed in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.28 Under this approach,
courts have allowed private suits when necessary to enforce statutory
provisions completely and effectively and to effectuate the goals of the
statute.2 4  This approach differed from the section 29(b) and tort
rationales because the purpose and legislative history of the statute were
not examined to determine whether the plaintiff met the fixed criteria
for protection. Rather, the legislative history and purpose of an act
were examined to determine whether the act required additional means
of enforcement. If public enforcement was not fulfilling the congres-
sional purpose, and an implied private right could provide a "necessary
supplement '2 5 to the act's enforcement, the implication was proper.20
Although the enforcement approach is less dependent upon legislative
history than the tort rationale, it lacks the guidelines for application
found in tort law.27  Each court, in its discretion, must decide what
factors will establish a "necessary supplement ' 2 8 and what factors
should limit liability.
Although the three traditional rationales provide varied routes for the
implication of private rights, each suffers from its own infirmity. The
administration of the Exchange Act requires flexibility beyond that
offered by the section 29(b) approach. Moreover, persons subject to
Exchange Act regulation require uniformity of administration so they
may plan their activities accordingly. The enforcement rationale may
offer great flexibility, but because it calls for a wide-open inquiry into
policy considerations, it presents a great threat to uniformity. The tort
rationale, although it offers greater policy input and flexibility than the
section 29(b) approach and includes clearly articulated liability limiters
23. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
24. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944).
25. 377 U.S. at 432.
26. Id.
27. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
28. 377 U.S. at 432.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that are lacking in the enforcement rationale, must rely upon legislative
history that may not be helpful.
III. NEw RATIONALES
A. Circuit Court Cases
In Ash v. Cort,29 the plaintiff, a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, brought suit against Bethlehem's directors for a corporate
contribution to the Republican Party's 1972 presidential campaign in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). 30 Section 610 provided only a
criminal penalty. Using a multi-pronged analysis that both synthesized
the traditional rationales and added a new perspective, the Third Circuit
stated first that in the absence of a clear congressional intention, the test
for implying a private right rests initially upon determination of whether
the plaintiff was within the class of persons that Congress intended to
protect and whether the harm suffered was of the type that Congress
intended to forestall. 3 Since the plaintiff satisfied these criteria, the
court proceeded to the second stage of its analysis: whether the request-
ed remedy was appropriate in light of the statute's purposes.32 Like the
enforcement rationale, this propriety test shifted the focus of inquiry
from the tort rationale's reliance on legislative history to the statute's
underlying purpose. The court stated:
Absent some reasonably clear indication of legislative attention to the
possible creation of a cause of action, however, courts ascertain the
policies underlying the substantive law and determine the propriety, as
a means of effectuating those policies, of affording litigants a particular
remedy.33
29. 496 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See 53 TEXAS L. REv.
168 (1974). See generally McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of
Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DIcK. L. REv. 167 (1976); Comment, Civil
Responsibility for Corporate Political Expenditures, 20 U.C.L.A.L REV. 1327 (1973);
Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for
Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392 (1975); 63 GFo. L.J. 1159 (1975); 12 Hous. L.
REv. 211 (1974); 47 Miss. L.J. 156 (1976); 6 RUTr.Rs-CAMDEN L.J. 453 (1974).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 610, as amended, (Supp. IV 1974), is part of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, § 313, 43 Stat. 1074 (1925) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 18, 26
U.S.C.).
31. 496 F.2d at 421-22. Ash qualified as a voter and citizen. The harm to be
forestalled was the "reduced ... ability of voters to secure a government responsive to
their wishes and [the] increased . . . likelihood of governmental actions favorable to
particular economic blocks but inimical to the general welfare." Id. at 422.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 421, citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971) (opinion of the Court), 402-03 n.4 (Harlan, J.,
Vol. 1975:1153] 1207
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As part of this second stage of analysis, the court discussed two ques-
tions: whether the requested remedy would be inconsistent with the
expressly provided remedies and whether an implied right would effec-
tuate the purpose of the Act. 4 The Ash court found that section 610's
express criminal sanction did not impede the implication of a private
civil right because, as a penal statute, section 610 provided no remedy to
the plaintiff.35 Furthermore, the court found an implied private right
consonant with the statute's purpose.386
Finally, at its third stage of analysis, the court made its most impor-
tant contribution by asking whether any "'collateral' considerations"87
would inhibit the implication of a private right. First, the court dis-
posed of the argument that the implication of a private right would
bring a multiplicity of suits. Although limiting enforcement to criminal
sanctions would prevent many suits, the underlying policy purposes,
presumably as evidenced by the design of the statute, was "to protect
many people from many possible violations. 38  Second, civil suits
would help enforce the Act since "the number of putative defendants,
committing acts more likely to be covert than notorious, is so great that
government enforcement alone might prove insufficient .... ,,31 Third,
the court considered whether the Act needed speedy enforcement. In
the case of section 610, the court felt that election contribution viola-
tions, in particular, required quick enforcement because an election
might be over before a violation could be remedied by criminal prosecu-
tion.40 In contrast, civil remedies offered swift enforcement.4' Finally,
the court asked whether an implied right would interfere with "a regu-
latory agency whose policy determinations on this or other matters
might be threatened by allowing private enforcement." 42  The court
reasoned that the "nature" of -the violation justified the interference.48
concurring), and Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989-99 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
34. 496 F.2d at 421-22.
35. Id. at 422, citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-02
(1967), and Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-41 (1916).
36. 496 F.2d at 422-24.
37. Id. at 423.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 423-24.
41. Id. at 424.
42. Id.
43. ld. at 423-24. This justification was based upon the apparent conflict of interestWashington University Open Scholarship
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The Ash analysis is significant because it established qualitative
guidelines that enable courts to explore more thoroughly the ramifica-
tions of implying a private right. It also provided a stage of analysis at
which policy considerations could operate as the liability limiters that
were lacking under the traditional rationales. The Ash court freed the
private right analysis from the tort rationale's dependence upon what
might be an equivocal legislative history. Moreover, the Ash "collateral
considerations" supplied policy centered guideposts that the enforce-
ment rationale failed to provide. The result was a more reasoned
approach to implied private rights because the court attempted to square
the purpose of the statute with the reality of agency administration
without simply opening the doors to litigation.
The second case adding a dimension to the implication of private
rights was Stewart v. Travelers Corp." Plaintiff was discharged from
his employment in violation of section 304 of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act which forbids an employee's discharge for garnishment
of wages due to one indebtedness. 45  After the Department of Labor
refused to take action on Stewart's complaint, he brought suit against his
former employer although the statute did not authorize a private reme-
dy.
The Stewart court's initial analysis parallels that of Ash. First, the
court determined whether the legislative history demonstrated an intent
to imply a private right.4 Since the legislative history was equivocal,
the analysis incorporated a portion of the tort rationale to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff had met the criteria to justify further
analysis.47 The second stage of analysis determined whether the stat-
between a presidential administration as both prosecutor of the violation and the recipi-
ent of the violation's benefits; a successful presidential candidate receiving contributions
in violation of the Act would be charged with enforcing the Act. Citing J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the court stated in its "collateral considerations" analysis
that "[t]he matter before us involves none of the 'special circumstances' discussed in
Borak as counselling denial of a private cause of action." 496 F.2d at 424. The court
failed to enumerate the "special circumstances" it considered.
44. 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, Restrictions on
Garnishment and Their Enforcement: Focus on Judicial Implication of a Private
Remedy, 23 U. K&N. L. R v. 729 (1975); 54 NaB. L. REv. 744 (1975); 77 W. VA. L.
Rv. 601 (1974-75).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970).
46. 503 F.2d at 110-12.
47. Id.
Vol. 1975:1153] 1209
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ute's express remedies ensured the full effectiveness of its underlying
purpose.48
"In the absence of a clear congressional intent to the contrary, the
courts are free to fashion appropriate civil remedies based on the viola-
tion of a penal statute where necessary to ensure the full effectiveness
of the congressional purpose. .... Where the interest asserted by the
plaintiff is within the class that the statute was intended to protect,
the harm of the type the statute was intended to forestall and the statu-
tory criminal penalty inadequate to fully protect the asserted interest,
a civil action for damages arises by implication. '4
At this second stage the court explored factors that might either bolster
or weaken the argument for finding an implied private right. First, the
court felt that an implied civil remedy would aid the achievement of the
statute's purpose since the criminal sanctions failed to remedy the harm
the statute was designed to forestall. Without a private right an individ-
ual was left unemployed and "credit stricken." 50
Whatever may be the rule of "adequacy" elsewhere, we believe
that when there is no clear congressional intent contrary to the implica-
tion of private civil remedies, the adequacy of a statute's express reme-
dies (or alternatively, the necessity of implied private ones) must be
determined according to whether those express remedies ensure the
full effectiveness of -the congressional purpose underlying the statute.
. .. [T]he initial question is whether the statute's protection might be
enhanced by allowing private civil relief.,
Second, the court found that the need to imply a private right was
overcome by neither the Department of Labor's mandate nor alternative
statutory or state law remedies. Third, the court asked whether an
implied private right "might diminish the efficient and fair administra-
tion of the statute in question given the complexity of the act and the
interests of those regulated by it."'5 2  The court found that an implied
right would not disrupt the "general administration of. . . the Act, or
unfairly affect the interests of employers."53
48. Id. at 112.
49. Id. at 110, quoting Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d
1031, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1970), and citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 191 (1967), J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
50. 503 F.2d at 113.
51. Id. at 112.
52. Id. (footnote omitted).
53. ld. at 113 (footnote omitted). "The issues raised in § 1674(a) claim [sic] are
Washington University Open Scholarship
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While consistent with the Ash rationale, Stewart dealt more complete-
ly with the questions of discretionary agency enforcement and the effect
of a private right upon both the regulators and the subjects of regula-
tion. When taken together, Ash and Stewart provide a comprehensive
scheme of analysis applicable to the administration of the securities acts.
B. Supreme Court Case
In June 1975, the United States Supreme Court reversed Ash, but did
little damage to the Third Circuit's analytical framework. 54 The Court
found an implied private right inappropriate because of intervening
law55-the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 6 -a
different interpretation of section 610's underlying purpose, 57 and what
the Court considered an "intru[sion] into an area traditionally com-
mitted to state law without aiding the main purpose of § 610 . . .-.
Despite the reversal, the Courfs private right analysis was remarkably
similar to the Third Circuit's analysis.
aimple ones, not requiring special knowledge of the economics or other intricacies of a
particular industry or type of employer." Id.
54. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Recently, the Third Circuit faced another
implied private right of action case, Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d
332 (3d Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs brought suit under the Federal Aviation Act §§ 404(b),
411, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1374(b), 1381 (1970), which prohibits discrimination in air transpor-
tation and gives the Civil Aeronautics Board power to investigate unfair or deceptive
practices in air transportation. Plaintiffs argued that they were the subjects of discrimi-
nation because they purchased first class hotel accommodations, but were given accom-
modations inferior to those given other members of the tour who paid less. After
reciting the test used by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, the court refused to imply a
private right of action because the "plaintiff-appellants did not suffer the harm the
tatute was designed to prevent;" a private right of action "would serve no statutory
purpose;" state law offered an adequate remedy; and a private right of action would
*undercut . . . [the Civil Aeronautics Board's] discretion." 523 F.2d at 335, 337, 338,
339. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
55. 422 U.S. at 76-77.
56. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26,
47 U.S.C.), amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86
Stat. 3 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.). The Supreme Court struck
down the contribution and expenditure limitations and the appointment provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612
(1976).
57. 422 U.S. at 80-81.
58. Id. at 85.
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First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted... ?""9  Second, is there any indication of legis-
lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one?60 Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?0 1 And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?0 2
The Court was concerned initially with the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974 that established the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) and provided procedures under which an individu-
al who suspects a section 610 violation may file a complaint with the
FEC.63  The FEC may transfer a complaint to the Attorney General, or
investigate it and then request the Attorney General to file a civil suit."4
The Court held:
if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate
court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule that governs, the
law must be obeyed .... In such a case the court must decide accord-
ing to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful
when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law,
the judgment must be set aside.6 5
Second, the Court believed that the underlying purpose of section 610
was to "[destroy] the influence over elections which corporations exer-
59. Id. at 78, quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis
added by Court).
60. 422 U.S. at 78, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974).
61. 422 U.S. at 78, citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S.
412, 423 (1975), National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974), and Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
62. 422 U.S. at 78, citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963), Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95
(1971), id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
434 (1964).
63. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(a)(1), 437g (Supp. V 1975).
64. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437g(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(7) (Supp. V 1975).
65. 422 U.S. at 76, quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103, 110 (1801). The Court went on to quote Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416
U.S. 696, 711 (1974), to the effect that had the decision under the intervening law
"[resulted] in manifest injustice" or had there been "statutory direction or legislative
history to the contrary," application of the intervening law would have been denied. 422
U.S. at 77.
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cised through financial contribution,""6 and that the protection of corpo-
rate shareholders, although a subsidiary purpose, was not a sufficiently
compelling basis for implying a private right without the added impetus
of other factors counselling for the implication.6"
The Court's third basis for the reversal was its belief that shareholder
affairs are largely a concern of the states. Since there was no indication
that Congress intended to broaden the protection available under state
law, the Court thought that no right of action should be implied.6"
Therefore, the Court reasoned that a private right of action would not
further the purpose of section 610, but would interfere with state law.
It is important to note that the Court did not criticize the Third
Circuit's analytical framework; the Court simply disagreed with the
answers the Third Circuit supplied to flesh out the structure. It is not
difficult to reconcile the analyses of the Court and the Third Circuit.
First, the enactment of intervening law clearly does no violence to the
Third Circuit's analysis. Presumably, had the Amendments been the
law at the time of the Third Circuit's decision, that court would have
been presented with a different case. Likewise, the Court's under-
standing of section 610's underlying purpose does not damage the
analysis, but rather substitutes a different answer to the same ques-
tion. Finally, the Court's consideration of the possibility of inter-
ference with state law easily fits into the Third Circuit's "collateral
considerations" inquiry. The Third Circuit's failure to evaluate inter-
ference with state law may be attributed to oversight or a failure to
develop fully all relevant collateral considerations.
The Third Circuit's class of persons-type of harm analysis easily fits
within the Supreme Court's "especial benefit" test. Likewise, the Third
Circuit's inquiry into the propriety of the implication in light of the
statute's purpose, including the implication's consistency with the ex-
press remedies and its ability to further effectuate the statute, clearly
comports with the Supreme Court's inquiry into the statute's underlying
66. 422 U.S. at 80.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 82-83. The Supreme Court's belief that shareholder affairs are largely a
concern of the states is disputable. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974); Fleischer, Federal Regulation of
Internal Corporate Affairs, 29 Bus. LAw, 179 (1974) (special issue); Malley, Far-
Reaching Equitable Remedies Under the Securities Acts and the Growth of Federal
Corporate Law, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1975).
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purpose and congressional intent to create or deny the remedy. More-
over, the Court's concern with federal interference with state matters is a
"collateral consideration" that the Third Circuit apparently would have
deemed appropriate to investigate, although it did not do so.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's analysis appears to modify the
Third Circuit's technique. The modification is twofold. First, the
Court more narrowly defined the class for whose "especial benefit" the
statute was enacted and the underlying purpose of the statute. Presum-
ably, a class of persons attempting to convince a court of the propriety
of an implied private right will have to make a strong showing that they
are especial beneficiaries of congressional action. The Court also de-
nied the ability of a court to imply a private right based upon a
secondary purpose of a statute without additional supporting circum-
stances.69 This is a significant narrowing that may have a great effect
in the securities area. The Court's last point of analysis, interference
with state law, may appear -to be in conflict with the Third Circuit's wide-
open collateral considerations inquiry, but the Court did consider the
effect of intervening law, a collateral consideration itself, and presuma-
bly the Third Circuit would have investigated any other collateral con-
siderations it believed were relevant.
IV. CREDIT REGULATION
The Ash and Stewart rationales are peculiarly suited for application
to the Exchange Act. They are valuable because they take into account
the complications of implying a private right under a broad regulatory
scheme that is administered by an agency whose efficacy may be im-
paired by such an implication. Furthermore, the collateral considera-
tions and underlying statutory purpose inquiries of these rationales
accommodate the delicate control that the Securities and Exchange
Commission must maintain to administer the complexities of the acts
and monitor the effects of its administration. These complexities are
present in the area of credit regulation under section 7 of the Exchange
Act-" This area, therefore, offers a suitable vehicle for testing the Ash
69. 422 U.S. at 80-83.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970). For examples of cases recognizing a private right of
action, see Zapach v. Elkins, Morris, Stroud & Co., 375 F. Supp. 669, 672 n.8 (M.D. Pa.
1973) (private right recognized, but not granted); Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill,
Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); Golob v.
Nauman Vandervoort, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1264, 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (same); SpoonWashington University Open Scholarship
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and Stewart rationales. In addition to the complexity of the Exchange
Act's administration, section 7 has an equivocal legislative history.
Moreover, private rights of action for credit provision violations have
had a confused and turbulent history. Finally, the confusion has been
sustained by developments in the last several years that appear to have
restricted the availability of implied private rights under section 7.
A. Background of Credit Regulation
Section 7 of the Exchange Act and regulations promulgated by the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) pursuant to this section provide the
statutory framework within which credit is extended for the purpose of
purchasing or carrying securities. Section 7 directs that:
(a) For the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the
purchase or carrying of securities, the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System shall . . . prescribe rules and regulations with
respect to the amount of credit that may be initially extended and sub-
sequently maintained . . .7
Furthermore, the FRB has the authority to raise and lower the margin
requirements when
necessary or appropriate for the accommodation of commerce and indus-
try, having due regard to the general credit situation of the country,
and . . . as it may deem necessary or appropriate to prevent the ex-
cessive use of credit to finance transactions in securities. 72
Section 7(c) 73 subjects brokers, dealers, and members of any national
securities exchange to the rule and regulation-making power of the
FRB. Section 7(d) 74 is a catchall provision that subjects persons not
covered by section 7(c) to the FRB's authority.
v. Walston & Co., 345 F. Supp. 518, 521 (E.D. Mich. 1972), afJ'd, 478 F.2d 246 (6th
Cir. 1973) (private right recognized; loss split between the parties); Manevich v. duPont,
338 F. Supp. 1124, 1126, 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 465 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1972)
(private right recognized, but not granted); Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323, 1327
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970). Margin transactions operate such that, for example,
if the margin requirement is 70 percent, a margin purchase in a general account requires
the investor to deposit with the lender 70 percent of the purchase price in either cash or
securities. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.3, 220.8 (1976). The FRB also establishes the loan
value of margin securities that may be deposited to meet the required downpayment. See
12 C.F.R. §§ 220.3(c), 220.8 (1976).
72. Exchange Act § 7(h), 15 U.S.C. § 72g(b) (1970).
73. Exchange Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970).
74. Exchange Act § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1970).
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The FRB, pursuant to section 7, promulgated Regulations T, U, and
G. Regulation T75 applies to every broker, dealer, or member of a
national securities exchange extending credit for the purpose of purchas-
ing or carrying securities. Similarly, Regulation U70 applies to banks
and Regulation G77 applies to other lenders. Although it would be
instructive for those desiring to understand the comprehensive scheme of
federal credit regulation to explore Regulations G and U in addition to
Regulation T, the application and underlying considerations of Regula-
tions G and U are closely related to those of Regulation T. Therefore,
the following discussion will be limited to Regulation T.
75. 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1976). For examples of cases dealing with Regulation T, see
Grimes, Hooper & Messer, Inc. v. Pierce, 519 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975); McCormick v.
Esposito, 500 F.2d 620, 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1974); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d
1176, 1181 n.6, 1182 (2d Cir. 1974); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365,
370 (1st Cir. 1973); Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469
F.2d 1166, 1171, 1180 (8th Cir. 1972); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136,
1140 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing Bronner v. Goldman, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 933 (1966), Washow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
and Remar v. Clayton See. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949)); Junger v. Hertz,
Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1956), and Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass.
1949)); Bronner v. Goldman, 361 F.2d 759, 762 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933
(1966); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 1959); Newman v.
Pershing & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 95,060 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 388 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Utah v.
duPont Walston, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,812,
at 96,715 (D. Utah 1974); Zapach v. Elkins, Morris, Stroud & Co., 375 F. Supp. 669,
670, 672 n.8 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield,
366 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Spoon v. Walston & Co., 345 F. Supp. 518,
519, 521 (E.D. Mich. 1972), ajfd, 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973); Manevich v. duPont,
338 F. Supp. 1124, 1125-26 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 465 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1972);
Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677, 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
76. 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1976). See, e.g., Daley v. Capitol Bank & Trust Co., 506 F.2d
1375, 1376 (1st Cir. 1974) (recognized private right of action under Regulation U and
granted rescission under § 29(b) of Exchange Act); Goldman v. Bank of the Common-
wealth, 467 F.2d 439, 440, 445 (6th Cir. 1972) (recognized private right of action under
Regulation U, but plaintiff did not prevail); Stonehill v. Security Nat'l Bank, [Current]
CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 95,224 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1975) (recognized private right of
action under Regulation U); Teitelbaum v. Scranton Nat'l Bank, 384 F. Supp. 1139,
1141 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (same); Cooper v. Union Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669, 676 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (same); Tartell v. Chelsea Nat'1 Bank, 351 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd per curiam, 470 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1972) (recognized private right of action under
Regulation U, but plaintiff did not prevail).
77. 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1976). See, e.g., Caldwell v. Genesco Employees Credit
Ass'n, 393 F. Supp. 741, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (private right of action recognized
under Regulation G).
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Regulation T permits brokers to maintain several different types of
investor accounts. In the "general account," 8 the required margin
payment must be deposited in the account within "5 full business days
folloWing the date of such transaction .... "9 Margin payments may
be in the form of either cash, securities that have been assigned a loan
value by the FRB, or both."' Investors may not withdraw cash or
securities deposited in such an account if the withdrawal would reduce
the value of the account below the required level.81 If the deposit has
not been made within the specified time, Regulation T requires the
broker-creditor to liquidate securities sufficient to reestablish the proper
margin level. 82
In a "special cash account,"88 a creditor may purchase or sell securi-
ties for a customer if the cash necessary for the purchase is in the margin
account or if the investor has in good faith agreed that he does not
contemplate selling the securities before payment and that payment will
be made "within 7 days after the date on which the security is so
purchased .... ,"84 Like "general account" transactions, if payment is
not made within the specified time, the creditor must either cancel the
transaction or liquidate the securities.85
B. The Law Before Regulation X
Before 1971, creditors who violated section 7 had little hope of
successfully defending against a private right regardless of the investor's
knowledge of the illegal extension of credit. Courts implied a private
right of action in favor of investors objecting to credit extensions larger
than that initially allowed 8 or for the creditor's failure to liquidate
78. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3 (1976).
79. Id. § 220.3(b)(1)(i) (1976).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 220.3(b)(2) (1976).
82. Id. § 220.3(e) (1976).
83. Id. § 220.4(c) (1976).
84. Id. § 220.4(c)(2) (1976).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439
(6th Cir. 1972); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677
(D.D.C. 1971); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Remar v. Clayton Sec.
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). See also source cited note 72 supra and
accompanying text.
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securities when required by the regulations.87 Courts used all three
private right rationales.
The section 29(b) rationale for finding an implied private right has
been the least controversial approach.88 This may be due in large part
to the resemblance of the rationale to an express remedy.89 Conse-
quently, courts provided investors suing for margin violations several
avenues for relief. First, courts granted rescission. 90 Second, investors
recovered damages. 91  Third, investors enforced their contracts,9 2 and
finally, courts allowed investors to use section 29(b) as a defense to
creditors' claims for unpaid monies required to finance transactions.
Under this section 29(b) approach, an investor may be able to
rescind his contract with a broker who simply arranged with a third
party for a loan to the investor even though the contract between the
investor and his broker was not illegal. Furthermore, in an action
87. See, e.g., Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.
1972); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971). See also sources cited notes 81-86 supra and accompanying text.
88. For examples of the § 29(b) rationale, see Daley v. Capitol Bank & Trust Co.,
506 F.2d 1375, 1376 (lst Cir. 1974); Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1972); Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth,
467 F.2d 439, 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1972); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th
Cir. 1959); Stonehill v. Security Nat'l Bank, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,224,
at 98,172 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1975); Newman v. Pershing & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Snc. L. REP. 95,060 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognized private right of
action under § 29(b), but plaintiff did not prevail); Caldwell v. Genesco Employees
Credit Ass'n, 393 F. Supp. 741 (M.D. Tenn. 1975); Cooper v. Union Bank, 354 F. Supp.
669, 674 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F.
Supp. 677, 678 (D.D.C. 1971); text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
89. See 3 L. Loss, SEcUrITIEs REGULATION 1759 (2d ed. 1961).
90. See, e.g., Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971);
Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Landry v.
Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973)
(rescission denied because plaintiff did not show Regulation T violation induced pur-
chase that would not have occurred otherwise); Newman v. Pershing & Co., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SE C. L. REP. I 95,060 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
91. See, e.g., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 372 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (damages
recoverable under § 29(b), but not a margin violation case).
92. See, e.g., Myer v. Shields & Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 126, 267 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1966).
93. See, e.g., Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.
1972); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959); Cooper v. Union
Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669 (C.D. Cal. 1973).Washington University Open Scholarship
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under section 29(b), even investors who knowingly received illegal
credit could prevail because the lenders' rights under the contracts were
voidable.9 4
The application of the tort rationale to margin violations first ap-
peared in Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp.95  In Remar, the court
allowed the plaintiff-investor to recover even though he received credit
with knowledge of its illegality. To use this rationale, the court grasped
what it considered to be a secondary purpose of section 7, the protection
of investors, and elevated it to a position sufficient to support the
implication of a private right.96 Further, because section 7 charged the
creditor with the duty to comply with the margin requirements, the
investor's knowledge of the violation was irrelevant to the determination
whether to afford him a right of action.97
The courts have been criticized for using the tort rationale in a way
inconsistent with section 7's legislative history, which indicated that
Congress was concerned not with the protection of investors, but rather
with the effect of excessive credit on the securities markets and the
economy.98 Congress considered the protection of investors only a by-
94. See, e.g., Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972); Goldenberg v.
Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
95. 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
96. Id. at 1017. For the further development of a private right via the tort rationale
under § 7 of the Exchange Act, see Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467
F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1972); Junger v. Hertz, Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805, 806
n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970) (recognized private right of action
under the tort rationale, but plaintiff failed to prove the cause of action); Bronner v.
Goldman, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933 (1966); Goldenberg v.
Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 1959); Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes
v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (recognized private right of
action under tort rationale, but action barred by statute of limitations); Aubin v. H.
Hentz & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Fla. 1969); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co.,
226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
97. See, e.g., Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677
(D.D.C. 1971).
98. See Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1140 n.7 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated:
The main purpose [of margin provisions] is to give a Government credit agency
an effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit
resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock market and out
of other more desirable uses of commerce and industry-to prevent a recur-
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product of the credit regulation legislation. 9 Furthermore, under this
approach, courts have largely defused the liability limiters normally
found within tort law. For example, contributory negligence has been
removed as a lender's defense because section 7 and the regulations
place the "burden of compliance" upon the lender.100
Likewise, under the enforcement rationale in Pearlstein v. Scudder &
German,10 1 an investor who knowingly participated in an illegal credit
extension recovered against his creditor. Although a strong dissent
urged that a private right under the circumstances would tend to encour-
age margin violations by investors, 10 2 the majority felt that the aid an
implied right offered to enforcement justified the "windfall . . . an
rence of the pre-crash situation where funds which would otherwise have been
available at normal interest rates for uses of local commerce, industry and
agriculture, were drained by far higher rates into security loans and the New
York call market.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1934).
100. See Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp.
677, 680 (D.D.C. 1971); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D.
Mass. 1949). The courts generally have felt that to superimpose contributory negligence
and causation on an implied private right of action under § 7 would obviate the statute's
purpose. Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, supra. Another limiter
discussed recently by the courts is the statute of limitations applicable to a private right
of action under § 7 of the Exchange Act. Since there is no statute of limitations in § 7
or the regulations, courts have applied the statute of the forum state. When two or more
of the state's statutes of limitations might be applied, courts have chosen the statute that
effectuates federal policy, but have looked to federal law to determine from what time
the statute begins to run. Generally, the statute runs from the time of the wrongful act.
See Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 388 F. Supp. 1294, 1300-03 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing
Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d cir. 1970), Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5
(5th Cir. 1967), Jannigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), Moviecolor Ltd. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 274 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1960), Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.
1959), Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., 11974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. f 94,760 (S.D. Cal. 1974), Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield,
366 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), McDonald v. Boslow, 363 F. Supp. 493 (D. Md.
1973), Maine v. Leonard, 353 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Va. 1973), and Josef's of Palm Beach,
Inc. v. Southern Investment Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1972)); Merkens v.
F.I. duPont, Glore Forgan & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fun. SEC. L. REP.
94,868, at 96,954 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,760, at 96,498 (S.D. Cal. 1974);
Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
101. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
102. Id. at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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unscrupulous investor" might receive. 113  Furthermore, consonant with
the enforcement rationale, courts have denied the defense of in pari
delicto to creditors who violated the regulations because section 7's
legislative history embraces the view that the investor has no duty of
compliance, and, therefore, an investor cannot be at equal fault with the
creditor. 0
4
C. Consequences of Pre-Regulation X Cases
Under the statute, regulation, and cases, an investor could receive
103. Id. at 1141.
104. See, e.g., Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973); Naftalin &
Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1972);
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1013 (1971); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677
(D.D.C. 1971). The authority for this view comes from the denial of an in pari delicto
defense under the antitrust laws. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
For other cases mapping out the boundaries of the private right of action under § 7,
see Daley v. Capitol Bank & Trust Co., 506 F.2d 1375 (1st Cir. 1974) (bank's failure to
segregate collateral held for Regulation U loans from other loans does not convert
nonRegulation U loans into Regulation U loans); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d
1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1974) (innocent mistake excused by Regulation T); Newman v.
Pershing & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,060, at 97,713-
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("performance of an otherwise legal contract, contrary to its terms,
in a manner which violates Regulation T, will [not] render the contract itself void
."); UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,841, at 96,832 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1974) (foreign corporation acting as statutory
broker-dealer prohibited from collecting debt from defendant because transaction violated
margin requirements); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11766, 8 S.E.C.
Dock. 250 (1975) ("president of a broker-dealer firm has the responsibility for compli-
ance with all applicable requirements").
A further limitation sometimes articulated by the courts on the implication of a private
right of action for damages suffered through a margin violation is that
"in order to show that his loss on a particular transaction was caused by a
broker-dealer's violation of Regulation T, the plaintiff must establish that
defendant's liberal offer of credit induced him to purchase stock which he
would not have otherwise acquired. . . ." Judge Tyler [in Bell v. J.D. Winer
& Co., 392 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)] held that once initial margin re-
quirements are met without objection, the violation can no longer be considered
proximately connected with a later decrease in the market value.
Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), quoting Landry
v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 370 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002
1973) (citing Newman v. Pershing & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 95,060 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., 392 F. Supp. 646,
652 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). For other limitations on a § 7 private right of action, see SEC v.
Packer, Wilbur & Co., 498 F.2d 978, 984-85 (2d Cir. 1974); Gammage v. Roberts, Scott
& Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,760, at 96,501 (S.D.
Cal. 1974).
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illegal credit knowingly without fear of adverse consequences. If the
value of his purchase dropped, he could bring suit against his creditor
for rescission or damages. 105
If an investor's purchases in a "special cash account" climbed in
value, he could earn a profit without any outlay of funds. He would
have ordered the securities through his "special cash account" without
making payment. Subsequently, the creditor would have neglected to
call for payment while the securities climbed in value. Thereafter, the
investor could either sell the securities at a profit before the creditor
demanded payment or, if the creditor liquidated the securities, the
investor could take the profit left in his account. Although the courts
applying the enforcement rationale prefer to aid the enforcement of the
Exchange Act despite the possibility of rewarding an investor who is
aware of the violation, it is difficult to accept an approach that rewards a
knowledgeable party to a violation simply because the burden of compli-
ance has been placed upon the creditor. Judge Friendly, dissenting in
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,'00 described the situation well.
Even assuming that the purpose of § 7(c) would be served by a
decree of private enforcement, I question whether the majority's free-
wheeling approach will have the desired effect. As a result of it, specu-
lators will be in a position to place all the risks of market fluctuations
on their brokers, if only the customer's persuasion or the broker's negli-
gence causes the latter to fail in carrying out Regulation T to the letter.
Any deterrent effect of threatened liability on the broker may well be
more than offset by the inducement to violations inherent in the prospect
of a free ride for -the customer who, under the majority's view, is placed
in the enviable position of "heads-I-win tails-you-lose.' 10 7
105. Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 370 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
106. 429 F.2d 1136, 1143 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
107. Id. at 1148, citing Comment, Securities Act of 1934-Civil Remedies Based
Upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 64 MicH. L. REV. 940,
953-55 (1963).
Recently, a number of courts have questioned the validity of Pearlstein, and the pro-
priety of implying a private right of action under § 7 of the Exchange Act on a second-
ary purpose of § 7 when using the tort rationale.
In Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. [ 94,760 (S.D. Cal. 1974), the court faced a sophisticated investor who used his
broker "as a mere purchasing agent." The court emphasized the negligible part investor
protection played in the legislative history of § 7 and concluded that "whatever concern
Congress had for the protection of the investor was with respect to innocent 'lambs."' Id.
at 96,501. Finding that the investor could not qualify as a member of the class forWashington University Open Scholarship
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V. THE 1970 DEVELOPMENT: REGULATIONX
In 1970, section 7 was amended to include section 7(f)'0 18 which
affected the position of investors purchasing on margin. Section 7(f)
makes it unlawful for investors
to obtain, receive, or enjoy the beneficial use of a loan or other exten-
sion of credit from any lender .. for the purpose of (A) purchasing
or carrying United States securities, or (B) purchasing or carrying within
the United States of any other securities, if, under this section or rules
and regulations prescribed thereunder, the loan or other credit trans-
action is prohibited or would be prohibited if it had been made or the
transaction had otherwise occurred in a lender's office or other place
of business in a State.'0 9
Pursuant to section 7(f), the FRB promulgated Regulation X for
the purpose of . . . [preventing] the infusion of unregulated credit
obtained both outside and within the United States into U.S. securities
markets in circumvention of the provisions of the Board's margin regu-
lations or by borrowers falsely certifying the purpose of a loan or other-
wise wilfully and intentionally evading the provisions of those regula-
tions.' 10
purchasing broker to deliver the 2,000 shares to his selling broker to cover the sale
transaction, and expected his selling broker to pay his purchasing broker the proceeds of
the sale, leaving a profit in the investor's account. The selling broker, however,
experiencing financial difficulties, paid the purchasing broker with "bad" checks. The
selling broker then went bankrupt. A trustee was appointed for Packer, Wilbur & Co.,
the selling broker, pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78aaa-77111 (1970), and the purchasing broker, Coggeshall & Hicks, Inc., brought a
claim to the trustee in the amount of the "bad" checks. The court held that Coggeshall
& Hicks, Inc. could not recover because the purpose of SIPA was to protect innocent
customers other than broker-dealers and that any recovery by Coggeshall & Hicks, Inc.
would be applied to its claim against the investor. The court explained:
It is one thing to allow. . . an investor who benefits from a margin violation
to sue his broker for his part in that same violation. It is quite another thing,
however, to allow an investor, who deliberately induces a margin violation, to
be reimbursed from a quasi-public fund.
SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., supra at 985 (footnote omitted).
108. Exchange Act § 7(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970).
109. Id. § 7(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(1) (1970).
110. 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1976). The courts have noted the possibility of a § 7
violation rising to the level of a fraud or a violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
See SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 498 F.2d 978, 983 n.7 (2d Cir. 1974), in which the
court stated:
Of course an investor who unintentionally or inadvertently participated in
a margin violation probably would stand on a different footing. It is doubtful
whether he would possess the scienter essential to establish a violation of
Rule lOb-5. Furthermore, he would not be guilty of a violation of Regulation
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/2
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Regulation X requires that
[a] borrower shall not obtain any purpose credit from within the United
States unless he does so in compliance with the following conditions
111
The conditions of Regulation X concerning the procurement of domestic
credit incorporate Regulations T, G, and U. Under Regulation X, an
investor procuring credit from a broker or dealer must now comply with
Regulation T, whereas before the promulgation of Regulation X, such
compliance was not required. 1"
Although it does not appear intentional, section 7(f) and Regulation
X may have remedied some of the inequities under the credit regula-
tions. 113 By requiring compliance by both investors and creditors,
section 7 (f) and Regulation X have removed the knowledgeable recipi-
ent of illegally extended credit from the class of persons who would be
X, the purpose of which is to prevent investors from "willfully and inten-
tionally evading the provisions of the [margin] regulations" . . . .
Id. at 985 n.13, quoting 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1973). See Merkens v. F.I. duPont, Glore
Forgan & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,868, at 96,954
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
111. 12 C.F.R. § 224.2 (1976). For the little judicial interpretation of Regulation X
that exists, see Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975)
(appeal from damage award); SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 498 F.2d 978, 983 n.7, 985
& n.13 (2d Cir. 1974); Newman v. Pershing & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
FmD. SEc. L. REP. 95,060, at 97,714-15 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co.,
392 F. Supp. 646, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Comment, Civil Liability for
Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f) and Regulation X, 43 FoR). L. REv. 93
(1974); Note, Regulation X and Investor-Lender Margin Violation Disputes, 57 MINN.
L. REv. 208 (1972); Note, In Pari Delicto As a Defense to Violations of Margin
Legislation Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 113
(1974).
112. 12 C.F.R. § 224.2 (1976). See, e.g., Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1972); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,
429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Avery v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
113. In Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., 392 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court stated
that "[slection 7(f) was enacted primarily to promote the stability of our securities
markets." Id. at 653, citing 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 4409-10 (1970). The
court went on to state:
In any event, this court recognizes that § 7(f) was directed primarily at im-
posing responsibility for compliance with the margin requirements on in-
vestors in order to control the "infusion of unregulated foreign credit into
American securities markets [which] can have a perniciously destabilizing
affect on the market as a whole."
Id. at 653-54, quoting 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4409 (1970). See note 116
infra and accompanying text.
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able to use section 29(b). Investors receiving illegal credit, as violators
of the Exchange Act, would have no recourse to section 29(b). Fur-
thermore, under the tort rationale, it can no longer be maintained that
section 7 was intended to protect investors who knowingly participated
in illegal credit extensions since section 7(f) has made them violators.
Moreover, section 7(f) weakens the enforcement rationale because it
makes investors who knowingly participated in illegal credit extensions
violators of the Exchange Act. Clearly, accommodating such investors
in the courtroom would encourage a violation with every suit.
VI. ASH AND CREDIT REGULATION
The Ash and Stewart analyses are applicable to section 7(f) of the
Exchange Act and Regulation X because the import of the section's
legislative history does not deal with the question of implied private
rights or with purposes that could be interpreted as an indication of
congressional intent either to favor or discourage an implied private
right of action. 114 Furthermore, this congressional inattention necessi-
tates a private right analysis that goes beyond the traditional rationales'
dependence upon congressional intent.
Both the House" 5 and Senate" 6 Committees that reported out the
amendment to the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act,11
which amended section 7 to include section 7(f), did not consider the
regulation of domestic credit to be the primary purpose of the amend-
ment.118 The regulation of securities credit was included in the amend-
ment only as an afterthought to proscribe more efficiently foreign
financial transactions that posed a serious threat to the stable and
equitable operation of domestic finances. Congress saw the procure-
ment of foreign credit, for the purpose of obviating compliance with the
credit provisions, as an integral part of a scheme used by organized
crime to evade taxes, to marshal the assets of black market trade, and to
operate in domestic corporations and securities markets without comply-
114. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970); S. REP. No. 1139, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
115. H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970).
116. S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
117. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 301(a), 84 Stat. 1124, amending 15
U.S.C. § 78g (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78g) (1970).
118. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, 24 (1970); S. REP. No.
1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1970).
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ing with the law." 9 Although the theme of the amendment was foreign
credit, the Senate Committee briefly considered the amendment's impact
upon the procurement of domestic credit. The Senate Committee
viewed the domestic operation of the amendment as a prohibition
against investor deceit in the procurement of credit. The prohibition
against investor deceit, however, had been in effect before the amend-
ment or promulgation of Regulation X.120
The legislative history of section 7 is susceptible to several interpreta-
tions. First, it can be argued that the primary purpose of section 7(f)
does not support an implied private right of action. Likewise, the
secondary purpose of section 7(f) does not support an implied private
right of action especially in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Cort
v. Ash that an implied private right based upon a secondary purpose
alone is inappropriate. Second, it can be argued that Congress was
aware of the courts' activity in implying private rights at the time section
7(f) was added to section 7. Consequently, when Congress added
section 7(f) without altering the courts' interpretations, these interpreta-
tions implicitly received legislative approval. Third, it has been suggest-
ed that since the prohibition against investor deceit had been in effect
before the amendment of section 7 or promulgation of Regulation X, the
addition of section 7(f) did not change the effect of illegal extensions of
domestic credit, and there "is little evidence in . . . [section 7's]
legislative history for requiring margin compliance by non-deceptive
investors receiving domestic credit."'' Regardless of the interpreta-
tion, the legislative history fails to identify the circumstances under
which a private right of action may be implied under section 7. The
Ash and Stewart rationales provide the analysis for determining the
propriety of a section 7 implied private right of action.
For a plaintiff to prevail under the Ash and Stewart rationales, he
must satisfy four requirements. First, the legislative history must fail to
manifest a congressional intention either to withhold or grant an implied
right.'22 Second, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons
119. S. RP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
120. Id. See, e.g., Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.
1972); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afI'd
mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Moscarelli v. Stamm,
288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
121. Note, Regulation X and Investor-Lender Margin Violation Disputes, 57 MINN.
L. REv. 208, 219 (1972).
122. See sources cited notes 31, 33, 46 supra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
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intended to be protected and the harm suffered must be of the type
Congress intended to forestall.12 3  Third, a private right must effecutate
the underlying purposes of the statute.' 2 4 Finally, there must be "col-
lateral considerations" that either support the finding of a private right
or do not counsel against such a finding.1 25
The initial step of the Ash and Stewart rationales may be met by
assuming arguendo that the legislative history of the amendment to
section 7 evinces no clear congressional intent either to grant or with-
hold a private right of action. This assumption requires that two lines
of argument be met to determine whether a plaintiff would fall within
the class of persons intended to be protected and whether his injury was
of the type Congress intended to forestall. At the very least, the un-
derlying purpose of the amendment and Regulation X has rewritten
the legislative intent found by the courts to support the proposition that
section 7 was enacted with a secondary purpose to protect the investor.
An investor who purchased securities knowing that the broker had
illegally extended credit cannot say that he is within the class of persons
to be protected by the statute because, under section 7(f) and Regula-
tion X, the knowledgeable investor is now a violator. The only person
in whose favor a private right might be found is the investor who
innocently purchased securities with illegal credit since Regulation X
expressly exempts such innocent violations.12 6
If the effect of section 7(f) is to read out completely the "for the
protection of the investor"'12 7 language that the courts developed, it is
difficult to see how even an innocent investor could prevail. This result
is supported by the legislative history of section 7(f), which barely
touches on the domestic credit situation, much less the plight of
an innocent investor. 2 " It could be argued, however, that since the
operation of the unamended statute129 and the regulations thereunder' 30
remained unchanged by the amendment, as evidenced by the portion of
Regulation X that exempts innocent mistakes by investors, the previous-
123. See sources cited notes 31 & 47 supra and accompanying text.
124. See sources cited notes 32, 33, 48, 49 supra and accompanying text.
125. See sources cited notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
126. 12 C.F.R. § 224.6 (1976).
127. See, e.g., Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
128. See notes 108-20 supra and accompanying text. See also note 107 supra and
accompanying text for discussion of secondary purpose of § 7 of the Exchange Act.
129. Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
130. See sources cited notes 75-85 supra and accompanying text.
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ly defined secondary purpose of the section would simply be changed to
"for the protection of the innocent investor."'' Likewise, it could
consistently be maintained that the harm suffered by the innocent
investor was of a kind to be forestalled by the statute. This reading of
the statute must be preserved if courts wish to imply a private right on
behalf of innocent investors.
At the third stage of the Ash and Stewart analyses, if the secondary
purpose analysis is maintained, providing a remedy to an innocent
investor would both allow him a means for redress and help effectuate
the secondary purpose of the section. Furthermore, unassisted agency
enforcement could be difficult and inadequate. No one need know of a
margin violation if such an illegal extension is made to an innocent
investor and the illegality is skillfully buried in the creditor's books.
Even the financial reporting required of brokers might prove to be
insufficient as an aid in discovering such violations. Moreover, a late
liquidation and a drop in the value of the investor's securities would
cause financial loss that neither the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's criminal prosecution nor an injunction could rectify.
Finally, under the "collateral considerations" inquiry, it must be
determined whether a private right would result in a multiplicity of
suits, 132 whether speedy enforcement is required,1 33 whether violations
are simple, 34 and whether a private right would interfere with the
Securities and Exchange Commission's administration of the Exchange
Act.' 35
Credit violations hardly seem to be an area that would generate a
multiplicity of suits. There are approximately 630,000 margin accounts
with member firms of the New York Stock Exchange.13 It is likely that
only a small fraction of the transactions effected through these accounts
result in violations. Furthermore, the number of suits brought before
Regulation X do not seem to have placed too great a burden on the
courts. In fact, prior to the promulgation of Regulation X, courts
tended to encourage private actions under section 7.*117
131. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
132. See source cited note 38 supra and accompanying text.
133. See source cited note 40 supra and accompanying text.
134. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
135. See sources cited notes 42, 52, 53 supra and accompanying text.
136. The Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1975 at 2, col. 3.
137. See notes 101-106 supra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
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The need for speedy enforcement under section 7 seems to be a
neutral factor counselling neither for nor against an implied private
right. Whether an action is maintained by a private party or the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, a violation cannot be prevented before
it occurs. The most that can be desired is that suits, whether by in-
vestors or the Securities and Exchange Commission, will deter future
violations. Although speed of enforcement does not seem crucial, at the
very least it would not present an argument against finding a private
right.
The Stewart court's concern about the complexity of the Act and the
difficulty of discovering violations may cause the innocent investor some
problems. Violations may not be simple. A violation in the form of an
overextension of credit may be complex; the regulations are highly
technical. 138 On the other hand, a broker's failure to liquidate on the
date required can be established without special knowledge. The secur-
ities either were liquidated on the proper day or they were not. More-
over, regardless of the issues' complexities and the need for special
knowledge to deal effectively with the issues, the courts have not been
reluctant to hear these cases in the past.139 The most crucial determina-
tion at this stage of analysis is whether allowing private litigants to
enforce the provisions of section 7 would interfere with the fair and
efficient administration of the Exchange Act.
Does the need for the preservation of prosecutorial discretion out-
weigh the need for a private right to aid the maximum enforcement of
the Exchange Act? The Securities and Exchange Commission is
charged with administering a complex statutory scheme that requires
sophistication on the part of persons working in the area. Consistency
in administration is an important goal so that those who are regulated
will be able to plan their activities accordingly. Prosecutorial discretion
allows the Securities and Exchange Commission to administer the Ex-
change Act flexibly to meet the needs of enforcement. It also fosters
both maximum enforcement and compliance by enabling the Securities
and Exchange Commission to gain the cooperation and confidence of
the securities community. To the extent that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission foregoes prosecutions to conserve manpower, how-
138. See 12 C.F.R. § 220 to 224 (1976).
139. See note 101-106 supra and accompanying text.
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ever, the implication of a private right of action would assist rather than
interfere with the Securities and Exchange Commission's administration.
VII. CONCLUSION
The courts will be faced with the task of determining the importance
of the investor's position within the context of the statute's operation and
its underlying policy. Presumably, an Ash or Stewart analysis would
never proceed far on the assumption that the underlying policy of the
section was to regulate the flow of credit into the securities markets
and to control its destabilizing effect on the economy. The value of
using these approaches to find implied private rights of action lies in
their fine tuning of the crucial criteria used to determine the propriety
of implying a private right. The Ash or Stewart courts struck a balance
that exposes the pitfalls of granting or witholding a private right. This
careful and measured approach gives guidance that was previously
lacking.
Washington University Open Scholarship
